



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

OCPAS/CIC

National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday
21 June 1983

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-145JX


21 June 1983

Copy 285

25X1


Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1


Contents



25X1

Czechoslovakia: Peace Conference Opens 8

Netherlands-US: Concern About Arms Sales 8



25X1


Panama: Election Dates Set 11

Special Analysis

USSR: Balance Sheet on the Leadership 12

25X1

Top Secret



21 June 1983

25X1

Page Denied

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Peace Conference Opens

The World Assembly for Peace and Life and Against Nuclear War, which opens today in Prague, is being held under the auspices of the Moscow-controlled World Peace Council. It is expected to attract more than 2,000 delegates from peace groups and leftist organizations around the world. US Embassy officers in Prague doubt, however, that many of the prominent Western and Third World figures invited by the Czechoslovak organizers will attend. The Czechoslovaks reportedly rebuffed a request by Charter 77 dissidents to participate and warned some Charter activists to leave Prague for the duration of the gathering.

25X1

Comment: The Assembly probably will fail to achieve its goal of winning public support in the West for Soviet positions on disarmament. Its anticipated strident anti-US and pro-Soviet tone will be likely to discourage participation by more moderate Western peace groups. The attention focused on the Pope's visit to Poland also will reduce the meeting's impact on world opinion.

25X1

NETHERLANDS-US: Concern About Arms Sales

Growing Dutch dissatisfaction with the US record in two-way arms purchases is jeopardizing the planned purchase of the US-built Patriot air defense missile system. Dutch press accounts and [redacted] the parliament will approve buying the Patriot only if the US offers 100-percent compensation to Dutch industry. According to the US Embassy, the Ministry of Defense recently sent to the parliament a letter that attributes failure of the two-way street primarily to the protectionist attitude of the US Congress and to the view in the US that compensation is a matter for private industry.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Comment: Dutch concerns about the trans-Atlantic imbalance in military procurement echo those of France and West Germany. At the same time, however, the Dutch acknowledge that this imbalance is partly the result of the weakness of European defense industries. They will be likely to increase pressure for greater European collaboration as well as for increased US purchases of Dutch equipment.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Page Denied


Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret



25X1

25X1

**PANAMA: Election Dates Set**

The Electoral Tribunal has announced that presidential and legislative elections—involving the first public selection of the president since 1968—will, if approved by the Legislative Council, be held on 13 May 1984. The new constitution provides that the chief executive and his two vice presidents are to assume office the following September. A second election for mayors, councilmen, and other representatives will be held in early June. The revised electoral code further stipulates that government officials, including National Guard officers, seeking high public office have to resign nine months before elections. 

25X1

Comment: The adoption of new electoral laws completes the process leading to National Guard Commander Paredes's planned presidential candidacy later this year. Paredes, a major proponent of the sweeping changes made in the constitution last April and of the electoral codes, will step down from his National Guard post in August. The nine-month rule reflects a compromise between the political opposition, which favored a one-year limit, and Paredes, who sought a shorter time limit in order to reduce to a minimum his separation from power. 

25X1

Top Secret


25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Special Analysis

USSR: Balance Sheet on the Leadership

President Andropov has emerged from the meetings last week of the party plenum and the Supreme Soviet with his power increased. His assumption of the presidency and the purging of two corrupt Central Committee officials demonstrated in different ways his political strength. Andropov made a few important assignments that weaken the position of his putative rival, Konstantin Chernenko, and other independent-minded Politburo members who were close to Brezhnev. His speech on a new party program indicated he still is searching for solutions to economic and other domestic problems. In contrast, the themes on foreign policy running through all the major speeches showed again that the leadership continues to agree in this area, and that support for Andropov from Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko should allow him flexibility.

25X1

Personnel changes last week, while not as numerous or dramatic as many Soviets and Westerners had expected, have the effect of adding to Andropov's power. Andropov's accession to the presidency denied the post to a potential competitor and gave him all the positions—General Secretary, President, and Defense Council chairman—that Brezhnev held at the height of his power.

25X1

The appointment of Leningrad party boss Romanov to the Central Committee Secretariat will dilute Chernenko's authority. Romanov joins Mikhail Gorbachev as a counterweight to Chernenko among party secretaries who are full members of the Politburo. Romanov's move to Moscow also creates an opportunity for Andropov to place a client in the post in Leningrad, which normally rates a seat on the Politburo.

25X1

Andropov presumably engineered the only addition to the Politburo, the promotion to candidate member of Vitaliy Vorotnikov. The latter is likely to replace Mikhail Solomentsev as premier of the RSFSR.

25X1

The fact that Romanov and Vorotnikov, as well as Solomentsev—who was named to chair the Party Control Committee—failed to advance significantly under Brezhnev suggests that Andropov is looking to a different and apparently more orthodox segment of the elite for support against Brezhnev's remaining clients. It also is no coincidence that three of the five Central Committee candidates who were promoted to full membership were associates of Ustinov, one of Andropov's allies.

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Despite these successes, Andropov evidently is still unwilling or unable to tackle the difficult task of trying to remove some of the most senior leaders from the Politburo. Until he has decided on politically contentious, major policy changes in the economic sphere, Andropov may see no need to make key changes in the Politburo. The changes he has made, however, put him in position to do so if future political challenges to such a program make it necessary. [REDACTED]

25X1

Domestic Policy

Andropov's emphasis on domestic issues in his speech to the plenum, which called for a new party program to set forth long-term national goals, suggests that domestic policy is the most troublesome for his seven-month-old leadership. The speech was couched in broad philosophical terms and did not unveil a new comprehensive program or point to any significant new direction in domestic policy. It did suggest, however, that the leadership expects the bureaucracy to discipline itself in the interest of labor productivity while new policies are being devised. [REDACTED]

25X1

Although the Supreme Soviet adopted a highly touted law on labor collectives that supposedly will bring workers more directly into management, there was little in Andropov's words last week to raise expectations of a better life. His message emphasized the need to work harder and to increase the quantity and quality of production. [REDACTED]

25X1

Some of the minor adjustments Andropov favors clearly run counter to current practice. For example, he suggested that reducing overblown staffs would force workers into labor-scarce sectors; that incomes and even housing should be granted on the basis of work performed; and that a "civilized" living standard should be based on "reality and discipline" rather than a distant promise of consumer abundance. To put these ideas into effect, however, Andropov will have to bring in like-minded officials to counter some of those closely associated with the more paternalistic policies of Brezhnev and Khrushchev. [REDACTED]

25X1

Foreign Policy

Andropov and Gromyko acknowledged that Moscow faces serious international problems, including "differences between individual socialist countries and fraternal parties." They gave a clear priority to strengthening economic and political cooperation to deal with the problem. [REDACTED]

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Neither Andropov nor Gromyko made new commitments to the Third World. Andropov, in fact, referred to the limits of Soviet economic aid and emphasized the responsibility of Third World leaders for their own economic success or failure. He did pledge, however, continued military support to Third World clients. [redacted]

25X1

The two Third World issues most important to Soviet-US relations were discussed by Gromyko without presaging new commitments. On the Middle East, he said Moscow was not a passive onlooker but added that "much depends on the Arab countries themselves" in their struggle against Israel. He did not mention the PLO feud specifically but called for Arab cohesion and described Syria as a "target of pressure and open threats." [redacted]

25X1

In one of the longest discussions a Soviet leader has ever made on Central America, he said Nicaragua was a victim of aggression "organized by the US." [redacted]

25X1

On Southwest Asian issues, Gromyko referred to the war between Iran and Iraq as "senseless." He clearly favored Iraq, and he offered Iran the choice between better or worse relations. [redacted]

25X1

Gromyko reiterated Moscow's tough stand on negotiations on Afghanistan. He said that it was possible to reach agreement on the "external aspects" of this problem but that "internal matters must be solved by the Afghans themselves." [redacted]

25X1

More broadly, the Foreign Minister was particularly critical of US policies as well as those of Japan. Regarding West Germany, he put Chancellor Kohl on notice that national security would dominate talks in Moscow next month—a sign that those talks could be difficult. In general, his remarks suggest that Soviet leaders will continue to try to go over the heads of chiefs of state to halt INF deployments. [redacted]

25X1

Despite the diatribes aimed at US policies, Gromyko continued to call for "smoother relations" with Washington and emphasized that the "struggle" for arms control could not be "relaxed." In addition to stressing the importance of START and INF negotiations, he specifically called for discussion of the implications of establishing a large-scale ABM system, talks "without a moment's delay" on banning the use of force "both in space, and from space with respect to Earth," and a ban on tests of "new types of nuclear weapons." [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret